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Abstract 
The anthropological discourse on the gift repeatedly underlines the impossibility of a free gift. This seems to be a truly universal, 
trans-cultural and trans-historical fact, since the gift always follows the unavoidable Maussian obligations to give, to receive and 
to reciprocate – every gift implicitly demands a gift in return. From this anthropological perspective, the gift plays a major role in 
establishing personal ties between people. However, this been said, it does not imply that the personal ties are only between 
equals – for instance, potlatch is a gift used to establish status hierarchy among people, a gift of rivalry in which the one who 
receives a gift is obliged to respond with another gift of a greater value. In this article I intend to analyze the way in which legal 
rules that apply to donations manage to deal with gift’s anthropological function in the context of authority and hierarchy, since 
the civil laws in European-continental legal family explicitly state that donations are unilateral and gratuitous acts, contradicting 
the anthropological discourse. In analyzing the function of legal provisions of the gift in the context of authority, I will use 
Alexandre Kojève’s classification of subjects of authority – Master, Judge, Leader and Father – in order to see the way in which 
the gift functions in these ideal-type power relations and the role of the gift law in these particular symbolic contexts. 
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1. The legal notion of the gift 
The written law in continental-European legal family has certain particular characteristics which guide the 
question of a European legal notion of the gift in the direction of European civil regulations. The written law in the 
continental-European legal family is characterized by totality, since it applies to all similar legal relations, by 
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ideality, since it’s not a result of an inductive process, and by continuous obligatory application (Ciucă, 2003, p. 
190-191).  
From the importance written law has in the continental-European legal family it follows naturally that the enquiry 
for defining the legal notion of the gift should start from the legal dispositions regarding gifts or donations in the 
civil codes of different European legal systems. In Napoleon’s Civil Code, article 894,  La donation entre vifs est un 
acte par lequel le donateur se dépouille actuellement et irrévocablement de la chose done en faveur du donataire 
qui l’accepte, and also in the formulation of the Romanian Civil Code of 1865, article 801, the gift is a donation 
defined in a similar manner. In the New Romanian Civil Code, article 985, The donation is a contract in which a 
party, the donor, with an intention to gratify, disposes irrevocably of his property in donee’s favor, who accepts it. 
In the Dutch Civil Code 7:175, A donation agreement is an agreement on a gratuitous basis, through which one of 
the parties (‘the donor’), engages himself to make a disposition out of his own property with the purpose to enrich 
the other party to the agreement (‘the donee’), in the Spanish Civil Code, article 618 La donación es un acto de 
liberalidad por el cual una persona dispone gratuitamente de una cose en favor de otra, que la accepta, in the 
Italian Civil Code, article 769, La donazione è il contratto quale, per spirit di liberalità, una parte arricchisce 
l’atra, disponendo a favore di questa di un suo diritto o assumendo verso la stessa una obbligazione. The German 
inspired civil regulations have similar dispositions regarding the gift – the Austrian Civil Code defines the donation 
in article 938 as Ein Vertrag, wodurch eine Sache jemandem unentgeltlich überlassen wird, heist eine Schenkung.  
We can conclude, after looking at the legal provisions regarding the gift in different European legal systems, that 
a gift is an inter vivos disposition in which the donor uses his property to enrich the donee without receiving 
anything equivalent. Therefore, it is essential to the legal notion of the gift that it is voluntary – no one has a legal 
obligation to make a gift, gratuitous – the donor gives without expecting anything in return, and unilateral – only 
the donor has the obligation to give, the receiver, by accepting the gift, has no legal obligation to make a gift in 
return.     
2. The opposing anthropological notion of the gift 
Marcel Mauss, in his 1926 study Essai sur le don. Forme et raison de l'échange dans les sociétés archaïques, is 
the one who articulated the problematic of the anthropological notion of the gift – all apparently voluntary and 
gratuitous transfers are, in fact, culturally constrained and obligatory, all those apparently gratuitous prestations that 
always have the form of a free gift, of generosity, would, in fact, mask the interest of the donor (Mauss, 1993, p. 38). 
Mauss realized that individuals and groups were not free to give, nor to receive or respond to the received gift with a 
new one, since cultural rules impose a triple obligation – to give, to receive and to reciprocate. The anthropological 
notion of the gift, which implies this triple obligation, plays a fundamental role in building personal relations, social 
ties, political alliances, status hierarchy etc., and the negligence in complying to the implicit obligations to give, to 
receive and to reciprocate would signal to the other the refusal of alliance or friendship, the acceptance of a 
subordinate position, an insult etc., relative to the symbolic practice in which the gift is embedded. Following the 
triple obligation, the parties, individuals or groups, would engage into a continuous relation of gift exchange, where 
to give, to receive and to reciprocate are the constitutive elements of a relationship based on mutual responsibility 
and trust. The fundamental principle which lies at the ground of every social organization is reciprocity, principle 
theorized by Mauss in his study, after analyzing the systems of exchange of the non-European cultures or archaic 
European ones, where gift exchanges took place especially among groups, such as families, clans or tribes (Mauss, 
1993, p. 41). Therefore, the legal characteristics of the gift in continental-European legal systems, as described 
above, such as gratuity and the unilateral character, are contradicted by the anthropological notion of the gift 
theorized by Mauss, which claims that underneath the legal explicit gratuitous and unilateral transfers lies the 
interest and the desire of the donor to form a social bond, to gain a privilege or any other type of symbolic gain. 
The symbolic practices in which the gift is embedded presuppose that the actors follow certain rules, which, 
although socially active and continuously respected, have no determined source that formulates or imposes them, are 
unwritten and have no explicit sanctions. The rules that structure the symbolic practices of the gift allow the actors 
to adopt certain significant conducts, and these signifying options constitute a language in which objects, as well as 
actions, such as giving and the refusal to give, receiving or the refusal to receive, acceptance and reciprocation or the 
refusal to reciprocate, function as semantic units. (Hyland, 2009, p. 9)   
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This intuition of the dual nature of the gift is still to be found in the dual meaning of the Greek word dosis, which 
means gift, but also dose, and also in the dual meaning of the word Geschenk in Germanic languages, which means 
both gift and poison. Publius Vergilius Maro said Time Danaos et dona ferentes in his Aenedid, giving, over the 
centuries, a warning regarding the apparent good faith and pure intentions of the donors, pointing to the ambivalent 
nature of gratuity. Everyday language also refers to this cultural implicit rules of the gift in phrases such as thank 
you, please in English or merci in French, servus in Romanian, which suggest that the simple fact of accepting a gift 
places the donee in a subordinate position – a servant (servus), at the mercy (merci) of the donor. The gratifier 
would respond with don’t mention it, you’re welcome, de rien, je vous en prie, c’est moi qui vous remercie, pentru 
nimic, cu plăcere, pentru puțin, phrases which have the role of reassuring the gratified of the gratuitous character of 
the gift, of the inexistence of a reciprocal obligation (Godbout & Caillé, 1998, p. 8-9).     
3. The notion of authority developed by Alexandre Kojève and its relation to the gift 
The notion of authority Alexandre Kojève develops in his theoretical investigations presupposes two ideal agents, 
a person of authority, the subject, which acts upon another person, the object, freely and consciously. The act of 
authority is the one that finds no opposition from the object of authority. This presupposes, firstly, the possibility of 
an opposition and, secondly, the free and benevolent giving up on this possibility by the object of authority. This last 
condition is fundamental for the existence of authority, since the mere actualization of the object’s potential of 
opposition has a vanishing effect upon the existence of authority – Kojève makes it clear that all authority is 
legitimate authority (Kojève, 2012, p. 35-37).  
From this general perspective on the notion of authority, the relation it presupposes has a lot in common with the 
gift relation. Following the suggestion of Marcel Mauss of the triple obligation to give, to receive and to reciprocate, 
the gratified has to accept the gift from the gratifier, and this act of acceptance places the gratified in a subordinate 
position, as indebted to the gratifier. The legal possibility of not accepting the gift or not responding to the one 
received with another gift seems very similar to the possibility of opposition to the act of authority theorized by 
Kojève. In fact, the possibilities of not accepting the gift or not returning a gift are the ones that derive from the legal 
notion of the gift, as prescribed by civil codes. The key to understanding the apparent contradiction of the two 
notions of the gift – the anthropological and the legal one – lies in understanding the potential nature of the 
possibility of opposition to authority and of the possibility of not respecting the Maussian triple obligation. The fact 
that these options are only recognized as potential seems as fundamental to the relation of authority as it is to the gift 
relation. We shall see, firstly, in which manner the cultural rules described by Mauss and the ones of the legal 
discourse contradict each other.   
Although the cultural rules that structure different symbolic practices of the gift impose the Maussian triple 
obligation, from the legal perspective, the gratifier has no obligation to gratify, the transfer from one patrimony to 
another is done by animus donandi, the liberal intent of the donor. The cause of the contract, animus donandi in the 
particular case of a gift or donation, is the essential trait of the French inspired contracts (Ghestin, 2005, p. 196) – 
article 1131 Code of Napoleon prescribes that L’obligation sans cause, ou sur une fausse cause, ou sur une cause 
illicit, ne peut avoir aucun effet; article 966 of the Romanian Civil Code of 1865 contains a similar formulation. 
Also, there is no legal obligation of receiving a gift – if the gratified refuses the gift, the donation is not perfected 
and it remains in the state of an offer of donation (Macovei, 2006, p. 88). The last Maussian obligation, the one of 
reciprocating the received gift, also has no legal recognition – the gift is a unilateral contract, it implies obligations 
only on behalf of the gratifier. If the cultural symbolic practices are governed by the triple Maussian obligation, then 
the written civil laws give the individuals the possibility of deciding independently on respecting the cultural 
obligations. The legal principle of l'autonomie de la volonté assures that every civil law subject is free to perfect any 
civil contract, to modify it or to end it, and, therefore, if the cultural perspective understands the gift through the 
lenses of the symbolic obligation, the legal perspective understands it through the lenses of the individual will. If, 
from the legal perspective, the gift has a unilateral and gratuitous character, from a cultural point of view the gift has 
a bilateral and interested character, since the gratified is symbolically indebted to the donor, who expects in return a 
gift or some kind of symbolical recognition. 
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The implicit nature of the cultural rules that govern the gift, theorized by Mauss, is the one that allows for a 
reconciliation of the two conflicting notions of the gift – the rules which impose the triple obligation can be 
observed without conflicting the explicit rules prescribed by law as long as they remain implicit. Even more, the 
notion of the gift prescribed explicitly by the legal rules is a fundamental condition for the functioning of the 
implicit rules constitutive to the cultural notion of the gift – precisely because the law affirms the gratuity and the 
unilateral character and the free nature of a gift is it possible for the gratified to follow the implicit rules and to 
respond with a gift to the one received. This double set of rules – implicit and explicit – specific to the gift relation 
seems very similar to the conditions of authority. Just as the possibility of a free, gratuitous and unilateral gift is a 
fundamental condition for the existence of the obligatory, interested and bilateral gift, the possibility of opposing the 
act of authority is a fundamental condition for the existence of authority. In both relations, gift-relation and 
authority-relation, the implicit and explicit are intertwined. The gift relation requires the explicit assurance of the 
gratuitous nature, just as the authority-relation requires the explicit possibility of freedom, the possibility of 
opposition from the object of authority.  
Therefore, the contradiction between the two notions of the gift, the legal and the anthropological one, is only 
apparent, since both aspects are constitutive to a gift relation. Not only are the two in no contradiction, but, in fact, 
the civil regulations recognize the cultural implicit rules in certain provisions, such as article 829 of the Romanian 
Civil Code of 1865 – The donation can be revoked in the cases of non-fulfillment of  the conditions of the donation, 
in case of ingratitude and in case of child birth after the donation) and article 1020 of the New Romanian Civil 
Code, which have similar formulations to the article 953 of the French Civil Code – La donation entre vifs ne 
pourra être révoquée que pour cause d’inexécution de conditions sous lesquelles elle aura été fait, pour cause 
d’ingratitude, et pour cause de survenance d’enfants. From the triple Maussian obligation, the French and 
Romanian civil codes retain the symbolic obligation of gratitude. The origin of this obligation is to be found in the 
mutual obligation of Roman pater familias and filius to assist each other in times of need with food, clothing and 
shelter, even after the end of the paternal authority after the emancipation of the son or the acquiring of the sui juris 
status (Ciucă, 2000, p. 882). The cause for donation revocation stipulated in the civil codes can be understood 
through the anthropological notion of the gift as a recognition of a certain reciprocal obligation on behalf of the 
gratified even in the case of a free, gratuitous and unilateral act, and also as a way of control by law over the sphere 
of the reciprocal gift that is to be returned by the gratified as prescribed by the implicit cultural rules. 
4. The function of the law in ideal contexts of authority  
Alexandre Kojève noticed that there were very few theoretical investigations on the subject of authority (Kojève, 
2012, p. 29). Searching through the history of philosophy, he identified four specific theories on this matter, each of 
them relative to four essentially different subjects of authority – the scholastic theory, which refers to the authority 
of God, the fundamental form of authority from which all the other kinds of authority derive; Plato’s theory, which 
grounds the authority of the Judge; the Aristotelian theory, regarding the authority of the Leader; the Hegelian 
theory, in which the Master-Slave dialectic is elaborated and which grounds the authority of the Master. Therefore, 
Kojève finds a relation between four ideal subjects of authority (Father, Master, Judge, Leader) which imply four 
different ideal contexts of authority that are grounded in four corresponding theories. 
The first ideal context of authority is the one in which the subject of authority is symbolized by the Father. 
Kojève illustrates this with the example of the divine authority, the one that God has over the faithful (Kojève, 2012, 
p. 42). The authority the Father has over his children also falls in this category. In this particular ideal context of 
authority, gift relations take place between the Father, subject of authority and donor, and the child, object of 
paternal authority and gratified. Although the language of the gift is most commonly used within the family, where 
the most rigid social relations take place, we should not forget the triple obligations Mauss thought to be essential to 
every gift: the Father has to give, the child has to receive and also to reciprocate. The first two obligations don’t 
seem very problematic, taking into account that the setting for this gift-relation is the family – indeed, all civil codes 
address the issues of parental authority, which consists of a mixture of personal and patrimonial obligations a parent 
has to his child, which places the parent in the position of the donor, both giver of affection, care, and provider of 
material conditions for the welfare of his child. From a cultural perspective, the child is placed in the symbolical 
position of the gratified, receiver – even from birth, a child is structurally incapable of refusing the gifts his parents 
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make, since all his needs are to be met by others. However, accumulating symbolical debts towards parents may 
consist a major obstacle in the child’s path to personal independence (Godbout & Caillé, 1998, p. 40-41). Gift-
relations and authority-relations go hand in hand in this ideal context of authority, since there is no possibility for a 
child to offer an equivalent gift in response to the gifts he received from his parents, and the symbolical debt 
someone has towards his parents represents the ground for paternal authority over children even long after the child 
becomes legally independent, with full civil capacity. However, law intervenes in this context of authority in two 
crucial points – firstly it limits the obligation of welfare a parent has to his child to a certain age of the child, and, 
secondly, it limits the reciprocal gift that is culturally expected from a receiver to gratitude. We shall return to this 
point, since it’s the most effective legal control on the gift relation. 
The second ideal context of authority we will address that Kojève identified as a specific context of gaining and 
maintaining authority is the one represented in Hegel’s Master and Slave dialectic. Different types of subjects of 
authority fall into the category of the Master – the authority the military has over the civilian, the man over woman, 
the nobleman over the peasant, the winner over the loser (Kojève, 2012, p. 42). Hegel developed this theory of 
authority starting from the example of a life and death competition between two persons each desiring the 
recognition from the other. The Master is the one who exposes himself to the risk of death, while the future Slave 
cannot control his fear of death and admits his defeat, recognizing the superiority of the Master, to whom he obeys 
from that moment on. The gift plays a major role in this context of authority as different anthropological studies 
show. Franz Boas analyzed a specific kind of gift exchanges that took place in Kwakiutl culture, located in the 
Vancouver Island of the British Columbia (Liebersohn, 2011, p. 99). This gift exchange, potlatch, took place at 
winter ceremonies and it consisted in a clan leader destroying his wealth while announcing that the strength of his 
clan is to be appreciated precisely by this apparently irrational destruction of goods. The gift giving took place in 
this ceremony as an act of destruction that could have been responded to with a similar act of destruction from the 
clan that the gift was addressed to. The triple obligation Mauss systematized based on the work of Boas took place 
in this agonistic manner, where gifts served the sole purpose of a displaying the wealth in this competition for status. 
The gifts were destroyed in order to gain symbolic status and overcome the rival through a destruction of a greater 
amount of wealth. To lose such a competition would have meant to lose the personal status and suffer public 
humiliation (Deliège, 2007, p. 125-128). The authority of the winner would have derived not from mere 
accumulation of wealth, but from the easiness of destroying it completely, setting himself above his rival who 
wouldn’t have risked as much as he did. The purpose that set in motion potlatch was honor, prestige, status, and, in 
order to obtain these, the gift had to be returned after a period of time. Reciprocating the gift instantly would have 
meant the recognition of the impossibility of paying a debt that would have grown in time (Hyland, 2009, p. 89-93). 
As Claude Levi-Strauss noticed, contemporary European societies have similar forms of potlatch – the gift exchange 
that takes place during Christmas, practiced by members of every strata of the society. Since it seems an irrational 
act from an economic perspective just as destroying goods seemed in the potlatch, and since the inability to properly 
respond to a gift has effects on the status and honor of the participants, this practice looks more like a status 
competition through exchanges of gifts (Lévi-Strauss, 1969, p. 56). 
If the first ideal context of authority, which has the Father as a subject, was problematic from the point of view of 
the impossibility of the object of authority to return the gift, consequently being forced to accept the subordinate 
position, this second context, centered on the Master as a subject of authority, rises the problem of ongoing gifts 
following the pattern Mauss described – to give, to receive, to reciprocate –  in order to win the status competition. 
In both contexts, civil laws intervene in order to control the patrimonial value of the reciprocal gift: from the 
analysis of the legal notion of the gift, the gift is a unilateral, gratuitous transfer, it implies obligations only for the 
donor. The gratified has only the obligation of gratitude, which is the way in which the law controls the economic 
value of the gift given as a response to an accepted gift. From the legal perspective, the gratified is not expected to 
return a gift of a greater value, which would inevitably engage the parties into a competition similar to potlatch. The 
law limits the reciprocal gift to gratitude, in the absence of which the donor can legally revoke his gift. Therefore, by 
law, the child and the slave, dealing with gifts as signs of authority from the Father and Master, are only limited to 
gratitude, substituting the patrimonial abyssal competition with the softer burden of gratitude. Both have the 
possibility of returning the gift, since it’s not prohibited by law, and this possibility makes the authority possible. 
Since the cultural rules ask from the gratified, son or slave, to meet his symbolic debt towards his donor regardless 
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of his personal welfare, the law limits the sphere of this symbolic obligation to providing food (if needed) of a value 
equivalent to the gift received, and to refraining from putting the donor’s life into danger or physically harming him. 
The other two contexts of authority Kojève elaborates in his work are centered on the Judge and the Leader as 
subjects of authority. The authority of the Judge is based on Plato’s theory that grounds all true authority on justice 
(Kojève, 2012, p. 48). The Judge derives his authority from a characteristic that makes his acts just: impartiality 
(Kojève, 2012, p. 50). The Leader as a subject of authority is the one who grounds his authority on expertise, on 
projects, on knowledge. The Leader is the one who has knowledge to grasp farther into the future than the object of 
his authority. We are going to address both contexts of authority simultaneously, since the gift has a similar effect in 
both contexts – the gift cancels the authority of the Judge and of the Leader. If the Judge accepts a gift he subjects 
himself to the third Maussian obligation, the one to reciprocate. If he cannot answer with a gift in response to the 
one received, he accepts a subordinate position. Both cases have a negative impact on the ground of his authority – 
impartiality. The gift-relations are kept away by law from this context of authority in a similar manner as they are 
prohibited in the case of the Leader. In order for the Leader to exert his authority based on knowledge, he must set 
himself above any gift relation governed by the Maussian triple obligation. The legal frame that keeps the gift away 
from these two contexts of authority are the ones that penalize corruption and all forms of bribery, which have a 
detrimental effect on actions based on impartiality or on knowledge. The law manages, through criminal provisions, 
to protect these fundamental contexts of authority, and it does so not by simply limiting the economic value in order 
to protect the parties, as it does in the case of the other two contexts of authority subjected to civil regulations, but 
by forbidding gifts altogether.  
5. Conclusions 
We established two opposing notions of the gift, relative to two fields of knowledge – the legal notion of the gift 
and the anthropological one. We then realized that the contradiction was only apparent, and that the explicit legal 
rules and the implicit cultural ones are two faces of gift-relations. We continued with analyzing the similarities 
between authority-relations and gift-relations and we showed how both depend on the possibility of their negation – 
the cultural rules depend on the explicit gratuitous legal rules that govern the gift, just as authority depends on the 
possibility of opposition, and from this perspective we analyzed the way in which law controls the function of the 
gift in four ideal contexts of authority as elaborated by Alexandre Kojève, centered on Father, Master, Judge and 
Leader as subjects of authority. The law plays a major role in these four ideal contexts of authority by preventing the 
objects of authority to prolong their dependence by spending their wealth beyond measure in order to reciprocate the 
gifts they received from their Fathers, by protecting the autonomy of the one who would lose to the Master in a gift 
competition and by keeping the impartiality of the Judge and Leader away from the chain of obligations the gift-
exchange implies.         
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